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 Alert correlation is a process that analyzes the raw alerts produced by one or 
more intrusion detection systems, reduces nonrelevant ones, groups together 
alerts based on similarity and causality relationships between them and 
finally makes aconcise and meaningful view of occurring or attempted 
intrusions. Unfortunately, most correlation approaches use just a few 
components that aim only specific correlation issues and so cause reduction 
in correlation rate. This paper uses a general correlation model that has 
already been presented in [9] and is consisted of a comprehensive set of 
components. Then some changes are applied in the component that is related 
to multi-step attack scenario to detect them better and so to improve semantic 
level of alerts. The results of experiments with DARPA 2000 data set 
obviously show the effectiveness of the proposed approach. 
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With the burst of the public Internet and e-commerce, private computers and computer networks, if 
not safe enough, are increasingly defenseless to damaging attacks. Hackers, viruses, malicious employees 
and even human error all represent clear and present dangers to networks. And all computer users, from the 
most casual Internet surfers to large enterprises, could be affected by network security violations. However, 
security violations can often be prevented. Some of the steps organizations can take to protect networks from 
threats and ensure that the data traveling across the networks is safe, are: anti-virus packages, security 
policies, access control, encryption, network scanning, firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs). 
Organizations continue to use firewalls as their central gateway to prevent unauthorized users from 
entering their networks. However, network security is in many ways like physical security in that no one 
technology provides all needs—rather, a layered defense offers the best results. Organizations are 
increasingly paying attention to additional security technologies to face risk and vulnerability that firewalls 
alone cannot address. An IDS analyzes packet data flows within a computer or network, searching for 
unauthorized activity, such as attacks by hackers, and enabling users to reply to security violations before 
systems are compromised. When unauthorized activity is detected, the IDS can send alerts to a management 
console with details of the activity and can often ask other systems, such as routers, to limit the unauthorized 
connections. 
Still current IDSs techniques are not good enough, as they suffer from some limitations [5], [6]: 
 IDSs generate a huge number of alerts [1]. 
 Analyzing thousands of alerts each day is impossible, especially if most of them are false positives 
(events wrongly classified as attacks) [8]. 
 IDSs may not detect some attacks [1]. 
To conquer these limitations and increase the effectiveness of IDSs, alert correlation has been 
recommended. Correlation analyzes the raw alerts, reduces nonrelevant ones and groups together alerts based 
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on similarity and causality relationships between them. Currently, there are five techniques for alert 
correlation [1], [2]: 
 Similarity based approaches, 
 Predefined attack scenarios based approaches, 
 Multi-stage approaches, 
 Multiple information sources, 
 Filter based approaches. 
This paper uses the correlation model that has been presented in [9]. Then a different technique is 
used in the multistep component to improve the efficiency of this component. As you can see in Figure1 this 





Figure 1. Graphical representation of alert correlation process [9]. 
 
 
The first two tasks in this model make alerts ready for the correlation process. The Normalization 
component, normalize received alert from different IDSs into a standardized format that is understood by 
other components. In the correlation process some alert attributes are important and must not be null. So 
Preprocessing component adds meaningful values to all required alert attributes (such as timestamp, source 
and target of the attack). 
The next four components correlate duplicate and close alerts and tag nonrelevant ones. The task of 
Fusion component is merging alerts which denote the independent detection of the same attack instance by 
various intrusion detection systems. The Verification is helpful for identifying false positive alerts. It takes 
each alert and checks the result of the attack that corresponds to this alert. If the attack is not successful, it 
properly tags the alert to exclude it from correlation process. In the Thread Reconstruction component, a 
series of alerts that belong to attacks launched by a single attacker against a single target is identified and 
merged together. The Attack Session Reconstruction component links network-based alerts with host-based 
alerts that refer to the same attack. 
The Focus Recognition component identifies the hosts that are either the source or the target of a 
significant number of attacks. This is useful for identifying Denial of Service (DoS) and port scanning 
attacks. The task of Multistep component is identifying attack scenarios. These attacks are composed of a 
series of single attacks that can happen sequentially in the network. 
The Impact Analysis component checks the effect of an attack on the appropriate function of the 
network. Finally the Prioritization component gives a suitable priority to each alert, based on security 
policies. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section alert correlation techniques are 
reviewed. In Section 3, our proposed alert correlation approach and results of our experiments are discussed. 
Finally, conclusion is presented in Section 4. 
 
 
2. ALERT CORRELATION TECHNIQUES 
To overcome IDSs limitation that was mentioned previously, several alert correlation techniques 
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2.1. Approaches Based on Similarity between Alert Attributes 
These approaches [26], [16], [13], [21] correlate alerts based on the similarity between alert 
attributes. Each alert is a set of attributes such as source and destination IP address, source and destination 
port number, start-time and end-time. A function measures the similarity between alerts and the output of  
this function decides if alerts will be correlated. All similarity based approaches are effective for clustering 
and merging similar alerts into groups because similar alerts in a group may correspond to the same attack 
[5], [6]. However, most of them are not able to making high-level alerts. 
 
2.2. Approaches Based on Predefined Attack Scenarios 
These approaches [17], [27] correlate alerts based on predefined attack scenarios. These attack 
scenarios can either be specified by the users or learned from training data sets. Most alert correlation 
approaches in this category are effective in detecting some known attacks. However, they fail to detect new 
attacks. Furthermore, an explicit attack scenario database can be difficult to build [4]. 
 
2.3. Approaches Based on Prerequisites and Consequences of Attacks 
These approaches [10], [11], [19], [20] (also called Multi-stage) correlate alerts based on 
relationship of earlier and later alerts. In these approaches, each attack is modeled by its prerequisites (the 
condition of a successful attack) and consequences (the result of a successful attack).They build attack 
scenarios through matching the consequences of earlier attacks with the prerequisites of later attacks [18], 
[22]. First order logic or some attack modeling languages (such as LAMBDA [20]) is used to model attacks. 
These approaches have the ability to detect new attack. However, building library of attack steps is expensive 
and time-consuming as there are a large number of attack types [4]. 
 
2.4. Approaches Based on Multiple Information Sources 
These approaches [12], [23], [24] correlate alerts in a network with several complementary security 
systems e.g. anti-virus packages, security policies, access control, encryption, network scanning, firewalls 
and IDSs. Generally various systems have different ability. So a layered defense offers the best results. 
Better protection with several heterogeneous security system also has some troubles. As we 
mentioned previously, an IDS can generate lots of alerts per day so several security systems can complicate 
this situation, and security manager will be overwhelmed in floods of alerts. In addition, security systems 
make alerts in different format. So alert correlation between several security systems is very challenging [5], 
[6]. 
 
2.5. Approaches Based on Filtering Algorithms 
Filter based approaches have been presented to remove the need for a complex attack scenario 
database and to reduce nonrelevant alerts. Porras et al. [24] proposed a mission-impact-based multistep 
approach where a filtering algorithm is used in the alert processing steps. 
The filtering algorithms are system specific. Therefore, they are expensive to use in comparison to 
the general method. Also detection accuracy of alert correlation depends on elaborate description of patterns 
in the filtering algorithm. So, there is a trade-off between the expressiveness of the filtering algorithm and the 
equivalent computational complexity. 
 
 
3. PROPOSED APPROACHAND RESULTS 
Most correlation approaches use just a few components that aim only specific correlation issues and 
so cause reduction in correlation rate. This paper uses correlation model in [9]. This model uses STATL [25] 
language to define attack scenarios in the Multistep component. As we mentioned earlier, predefined attack 
scenario based approaches fail to detect new attacks, but multi-stage approaches does not have this defect. So 
we use the approach that has been presented in [20] (LAMBDA language) to model attacks based on 
prerequisites and consequences. 
In LAMBDA an attack is specified with five fields: 
 Attack Precondition: logical conditions to be satisfied for a successful attack. 
 Attack Postcondition: logical conditions that specify the result of the successful attack. 
 Attack scenario: the scenario of the attack that intruder performs. This field gives us the benefit of 
predefined attack scenarios based approaches. 
 Detection scenario: the combination of events that correspond to this attack. 
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 Verification scenario: a combination of actions to be done to check if the attack succeeds. As we use 
correlation model in [9], and there is a Verification component that does this task, we do not need this 
field. 
After specifying an attack base in LAMBDA, the offline correlation process analyzes these attack 
descriptions to automatically generate a set of correlation rules. Correlation rules can be devided into two 
types: direct correlation and indirect correlation. The online correlation process then applies to these 
correlation rules on the alerts generated by the IDSs to detect more multistep attack scenarios [20]. 
To evaluate the efficiency of our approach in building attack scenarios we performed an experiment 
using the “LLDOS 1.0 Inside” from DARPA 2000 data set [28]. 
The five phases of the multistep attack scenario in LLDOS 1.0 are [28]:  
 IPsweep from a remote site to determine which hosts are live. 
 Probe of live IP's to determine which of the hosts selected in previous phase are running the Sadmind 
service. 
 Breakins via performing the sadmind Remote-to-Root exploit several times. 
 Installation of a DDoS software in the three compromised hosts. 
 Launching the DDoS attack against the final victim. 
DARPA 2000 data set is the raw event streams of the network and does not contain any IDS alerts. 
So we need to replay the related packets on a network interface card and set the IDS to generate alerts. We 
used Colasoft Packet Player software for repalying packets, and Snort [7], [14], [15] as an IDS. 
Figure2 shows the correlation graph of this multistep attack that has been detected by our method in 






Figure 2. Correlation graph of the multistep attack. 
 
 
Snort generated “ICMP Ping” and “ICMP Echo Reply” for the first phase of the attack. “RPC 
portmapsadmind request UDP” is generated when an attempt is made through a portmap GETPORT request 
to discover the port where the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) sadmind is listening and belongs to the second 
phase.“RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP” is generated in phase three when an attempt 
is made to exploit a known vulnerability associated with the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) sadmind. 
“RSERVICES rsh root” means attacker may have gained superuser access to the host and belongs to phase 
four. “DDOS mstream agent to handler” and “DDOS mstream handler to agent” indicate a host may have 
been compromised and mstream may have been installed and belong to phase four and five. Snort did not 
detect the DDOS attack against the final victim. 
Snort generated 720 alerts for this data set. After correlating alerts, the result obtained for the data 
set is as follows:  
 Normalization: this component passes all alerts through; therefore, it does not reduce the number of the 
alerts received as input. 
 Preprocessing: based on the task of this component, it does not reduce the number of alerts. 
 Alert Fusion: the analyzed data set was produced by a single sensor; therefore, no fusion was possible. 
 Alert Verification: the alert verification process needs the protected resources and a detailed model of the 
installed network services to be available for real-time verification. Unfortunately, this information is not 
available for data set that we analyzed. 
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 Thread Reconstruction: this component can significantly reduce alert when a very large number of alerts 
have been generated as the result of a single attack.  Thread Reconstruction reduced alerts from 720 to 
255, so reduction rate is 64.58 percent. 
 Attack Session Reconstruction: this component requires either real-time access to the systems being 
protected or very detailed auditing information in order to map network-based alerts to host-based alerts. 
For the analyzed data set, this information was not provided. 
 Focus Recognition: this component is effective in reducing alerts of our data set. The reduction is 
especially high when DDoS or large-scale scanning attempts exist in the data set. Focus Recognition 
reduced alert from 255 to154, so reduction rate is 39.60 percent. 
Multistep Correlation: while Multistep attack component may not reduce alerts as much as other 
components, it often provides a high improvement in the abstraction level of the generated meta-alerts. 
This component reduced alert from 154 to 141, thus reduction rate is 8.44 percent. 
 Impact Analyzer: impact analysis needs a exact modeling of the relationships between resources in a 
network and needs the continuous monitoring of the health of those resources. So, DARPA 2000 data set 
cannot be used to evaluate the effectiveness of this component. 
 Prioritization: alert prioritizing needs information about the network and nature of the attack to identify 
if one alert or meta-alert should be considered more important than another. So, we need an exact 
description of how to prioritize alerts which is not available for the data set. 
Table 1 shows the impact of proposed alert correlation method, briefly. 
 
 
Table 1. Impact of proposed alert correlation method 
 Input Alerts Output Alerts Reduction  
1.Normalization 720 720 0.00%  
2.Preprocessing 720 720 0.00%  
3.Alert Fusion 720 720 0.00%  
4.Alert Verification 720 720 0.00%  
5.Thread Reconstruction 720 255 64.58%  
6.Attack Session Reconstruction 255 255 0.00%  
7.Focus Recognition 255 154 39.60%  
8.Multistep Correlation 154 141 8.44%  
9.Impact Analyzer 141 141 0.00%  
10.Prioritization 141 141 0.00%  





In this paper, we discussed the importance of alert correlation process in reducing alerts and making 
a high-level state report of the protected network. Then alert correlation techniques have been reviewed. 
Some techniques like predefined known scenario approach can detect known attacks. Some like prerequisite 
and consequence approach can detect new attacks but needs a library of single attacks. For alert correlation, 
we used the model that has been proposed in [9] and tried to improve multistep attack component. Actually 
we used an approach based on prerequisite and consequence. As the results show, this change led to detect 
multistep attack scenario completely and so has a better correlation rate. Our future work will focus on other 
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